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Abstract 
New drugs serving unmet medical needs are one of the key value drivers of research-based pharmaceutical com-
panies. The efficiency of research and development (R&D), defined as the successful approval and launch of new 
medicines (output) in the rate of the monetary investments required for R&D (input), has declined since decades. 
We aimed to identify, analyze and describe the factors that impact the R&D efficiency. Based on publicly available 
information, we reviewed the R&D models of major research-based pharmaceutical companies and analyzed the key 
challenges and success factors of a sustainable R&D output. We calculated that the R&D efficiencies of major research-
based pharmaceutical companies were in the range of USD 3.2–32.3 billion (2006–2014). As these numbers challenge 
the model of an innovation-driven pharmaceutical industry, we analyzed the concepts that companies are following 
to increase their R&D efficiencies: (A) Activities to reduce portfolio and project risk, (B) activities to reduce R&D costs, 
and (C) activities to increase the innovation potential. While category A comprises measures such as portfolio man-
agement and licensing, measures grouped in category B are outsourcing and risk-sharing in late-stage development. 
Companies made diverse steps to increase their innovation potential and open innovation, exemplified by open 
source, innovation centers, or crowdsourcing, plays a key role in doing so. In conclusion, research-based pharmaceu-
tical companies need to be aware of the key factors, which impact the rate of innovation, R&D cost and probability 
of success. Depending on their company strategy and their R&D set-up they can opt for one of the following open 
innovators: knowledge creator, knowledge integrator or knowledge leverager.
© 2016 Schuhmacher et al. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International 
License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/), which permits unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any 
medium, provided you give appropriate credit to the original author(s) and the source, provide a link to the Creative Commons 
license, and indicate if changes were made. The Creative Commons Public Domain Dedication waiver (http://creativecommons.
org/publicdomain/zero/1.0/) applies to the data made available in this article, unless otherwise stated.
Background
The importance of research and development (R&D) for 
the pharmaceutical industry is evidenced by the cumula-
tive R&D expenditure in this sector as a whole but also 
on the individual company level. The total worldwide 
R&D spend of pharmaceutical and biotechnology compa-
nies increased from USD 108 billion (2006) to USD 141 
billion (2015) [1]. Amongst the world top 50 companies 
by total R&D investment in the fiscal year 2014/2015 
were 16 pharmaceutical companies. Novartis (5), Roche 
(7), Johnson & Johnson (J&J, 8) and Pfizer (10) ranked in 
the top 10 of the leading R&D investing companies glob-
ally [2]. Accordingly, the pharmaceutical industry is a 
worldwide top investor in R&D today and it is predicted 
that it will keep its role as a leading R&D stakeholder in 
the future with an industry-wide forecasted total R&D 
spend of USD 160 billion by 2020 [1]. It is predicted that 
Novartis (10.5), Roche (9.1), Pfizer (7.5), Merck & Co. 
(7.1), J&J (6.7), Sanofi (6.1), AstraZeneca (5.6) and Glaxo-
SmithKline (GSK, 5.4) will still allocate more then USD 5 
billion on R&D in 2020 [1].
The challenge related to the high R&D spend is the 
rising expectations of investors for a reasonable return 
of investment (ROI) provided by a high number of new 
molecular entities (NMEs) launched to the major phar-
maceutical markets. Although exceptions exist, the 
industry as a whole did not live up to these expectations, 
as the total number of NMEs commercialized in past 
years did not match with the extraordinary high R&D 
costs. Measured by the number of NMEs approved by the 
US Food and Drug Administration (FDA), most of the 
top pharmaceutical companies did not launch enough 
new drugs in the past years to achieve the reported 
2–3 NMEs/year/company which would be necessary to 
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achieve the growth objectives based on product innova-
tion [3–9]. In consequence, this misbalance put a ques-
tion mark to the long-term sustainability of the industry’s 
R&D model and forced the big companies in the industry 
to search for other growth options and potential savings.
This article reviews the efficiency parameters of phar-
maceutical R&D and the consequences of the low R&D 
input/output-ratio for the industry. Moreover, it illus-
trates and exemplifies the role of open innovation in the 
pharmaceutical sector. Last, it outlines why a change in 
the R&D model is required and which models pharma-
ceutical companies may follow to increase the productiv-
ity of their R&D organizations.1
The risks of pharmaceutical R&D
The Center for Medicine Research International (CMR) 
reported in its Pharmaceutical R&D Factbook 2014 an 
average success rate of 4.9  % from first toxicity dose to 
market approval with between phase success rates of 66, 
44, 26, 72 and 91 % from first toxicity dose to first human 
dose, first human dose to first patient dose, first patient 
dose to first pivotal dose, first pivotal dose to first submis-
sion and first submission to first launch, respectively [11]. 
Paul et al. [12] reported success rates of 51 % for discovery 
research, 69 % for preclinical development, 12.8 % for the 
clinical development phases and 91 % for the submission 
phase, resulting in an overall probability of technical and 
regulatory success (PTRS) for drug R&D of 4.1 % [12].
In general, the reasons of the reported high attrition 
rates are diverse and comprise [13]:
  • lack of reliability of published data [14],
  • biopharmaceutical issues including suboptimal PK 
[4],
  • poorly predictive preclinical models in discovery 
research and preclinical testing [15],
  • the concept of target-based drug discovery with the 
related advanced complexity of target selection, a 
competition for proprietary targets and the complex 
process of target validation, [15–19].
  • complexity of clinical trials (to treat chronic dis-
eases), together with increasing demands from regu-
latory authorities and payers, and
  • the lack of know-how of smaller organizations result-
ing in a lower PTRS from Phase I to submission than 
large organizations [20].
The FDA approvals in 2012 have been reviewed in this 
context and lack of efficacy (56  %), safety issues (28  %), 
1 This review details the efficiency parameters of pharmaceutical R&D 
and the consequences of the low R&D efficiency for the industry. See also 
Schuhmacher et al. [10].
changing strategies (7 %), commercial reasons (5 %) and 
operational challenges (5  %) are the most probable rea-
sons of failures that happened in phase II and phase III of 
clinical development [21]. These results were confirmed 
by a second analysis of 142 drug R&D projects of Astra-
Zeneca [22]. Preclinical and phase I projects primarily 
failed for safety reasons and projects failing in phases II 
and III commonly lacked efficacy [22].
The higher target-specificity and reduced incidence of 
off-target effects of biologics, such as monoclonal anti-
bodies, proteins, or peptides, for naturally occurring 
ligands suggests that these molecules might have higher 
chances of success than smaller molecules. Since 2004, 
several authors have compared the success rates for small 
molecules with those of biologics [4, 23–25]. All of them 
consistently found higher success rates for biologics. The 
likelihood of successful approval from phase I across all 
therapeutic areas and indications was in the 10 %-range. 
For biologics these phase transition rates from phase I 
to approval were higher [4, 23–25]. On the other hand, 
Hay et al. [25] provided data demonstrating that the sta-
tus of being a lead indication or being an oncology pro-
ject impacts the PTRS in the same way as the distinction 
between small molecules and biologics. Therefore and 
in our view, these findings need to be interpreted with 
caution. The sample sizes, especially for biologics, are 
relatively small and the unequal distribution of biolog-
ics across therapeutic areas and types of company (big 
pharma vs. biotech) might have biased the results. Addi-
tionally, some authors have described a wrong classifi-
cation of biologics to be small molecules and vice versa 
which again biases the interpretation of available data.
Interval durations for drug R&D
As of its direct link to opportunity cost and reduction of 
the patent life, overall R&D time and interval durations 
are of greatest interest as an R&D efficiency measure. 
According to Paul et al. [12], drug R&D (across all ther-
apeutic areas) takes on average 14 years [12]. Discovery 
research lasts for 4.5 years, preclinical testing continues 
for 1  year, the three clinical development phases take 
1.5, 2.5 and 2.5  years, respectively, and the phase from 
submission to launch requires another 18  months [12]. 
Interval durations for basic research and post-approval 
Phase IV trials need to be added to the overall R&D time 
to consider the entire pharmaceutical R&D process.
There are two additional findings when reviewing drug 
R&D timelines:
  • Clinical development today takes more time than 
in the past. While the average clinical development 
time for drugs approved between 2005 and 2009 
was 6.4  years [26], newer data from the 2014 CMR 
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Factbook show that the composite median interval 
duration for ongoing development projects (2008–
2012) is 9.1 years. The CMR data clearly show a trend 
toward increased interval durations in preclinical 
development (+17 %, 2004–2012) and in phase I of 
clinical development (+58 %, 2004–2012).
  • The average time for the FDA review and approval 
has decreased significantly since the enactment of 
the Prescription Drug User Fee Act (PDUFA) [26, 
27]. One aspect that may have contributed positively 
to faster review and approval timelines are the fast-
track status or accelerated approvals for new drugs in 
indications with a high unmet medical need, such as 
in oncology.
The long overall time of pharmaceutical R&D impacts 
the total R&D costs, the risk of industry rivalry and the 
uncertainties of generic competition. First, investments 
in R&D projects were incurred many years ago and need 
to be capitalized till the date of ROI of the new drug. 
The capitalization of R&D costs results in an enormous 
increase in the overall R&D expenditures [12]. Second, 
as many pharmaceutical companies follow comparable 
strategies as to therapeutic areas, target diseases, bio-
logic mechanisms and drug targets, the long R&D time-
lines increase the risk of competition, reduce the chance 
to be first-in-market, cut the market potential and the 
commercial success of a drug candidate. Third, the effec-
tive date of generic competition influences the ROI of a 
new drug, as any delay in drug development results in a 
reduction of the commercially usable patent term.
Risks and time influence R&D costs negatively
The costs for pharmaceutical R&D increased in the past 
decades significantly. Munos [3] reported an annual 
inflation-adjusted increase of R&D costs of 8.6 % for the 
period of 1950–2009 [3]. Other studies support this view: 
while the costs per NME were published to be USD 250 
million before the 1990s, the average out-of-the-pocket 
costs per NME have been calculated to be USD 403 mil-
lion (2000s) and USD 873 million (2010), respectively [12, 
28, 29]. The low success rates and the respective costs of 
failed drug projects are causal for the high out-of-the-
pocket costs. In addition, the use of new technologies 
to reduce the timelines and to increase success rates in 
drug discovery, such as combinatorial chemistry, DNA 
sequencing, high-throughput-screening (HTS) or com-
putational drug design, may have further increased R&D 
costs just as larger clinical trial sizes and better clinical 
infrastructure. Split to the phases of R&D, Paul et al. [12] 
reported that drug discovery and preclinical develop-
ment account for 33 % of the total cost per NME (USD 
281 million), clinical development (phase I to submis-
sion) represents 63 % (USD 548 million) and submission 
to launch costs 5 % (USD 44 million) of the overall expen-
ditures per NME [12]. In view of the long time intervals, 
these out-of-the-pocket costs add together in extraordi-
nary high capitalized costs of reported of USD 1.778 bil-
lion (2010) per NME [12, 19, 28].
Such cost calculations do not include all expenditures 
associated directly and indirectly with drug R&D. Costs 
for basic research, phase IV trials, regulatory approvals 
in non-US markets or product life-cycle management 
need to be added. Exemplified by data from the 2014 
CMR Factbook that 25.7 % of all costs of R&D are dedi-
cated to the international roll-out and line extensions, 
the actual costs per new drug are higher than the ana-
lyzed USD 1.778 billion. Potentially, the results provided 
by Harper [30] illustrate the real costs, as he analyzed the 
expenditures per NME launched by leading pharmaceu-
tical companies to be USD 3-12 billion. And he investi-
gated that the top pharmaceutical companies, defined as 
those that have launched more than four NMEs between 
2002–2011, invested more than USD 5 billion per new 
drug.
The actual challenge for the pharmaceutical 
industry
The actual challenge for the industry comes from put-
ting the costs of pharmaceutical R&D in context to the 
output, namely the number of NMEs launched to the 
market. Scannell et  al. [19] have analyzed the histori-
cal input/output-ratio of the pharmaceutical industry 
and concluded a bisection of the R&D efficiency every 
9  years between 1950–2010 [19]. Although todays out-
put of some research-based pharmaceutical companies is 
remarkable, such as the 13 NMEs launched by Novartis 
in the period of 2006–2014, contrasting the output fig-
ures per company to their total R&D expenditure of up 
to USD 80 billion (2006–2014) highlights the real chal-
lenge the companies are facing (see Fig.  1). Although 
such analyses comprise inherent inaccuracies, such as the 
input parameter does not match time-wise with the out-
put correctly, it still shows the dilemma of the pharma-
ceutical industry.
In consequence and following the argumentation of 
Harper [30] the historical calculation of approximately 
USD 1 billion per approved drug needs to be corrected 
to an amount of more than USD 3 billion (see Table 1). 
In detail, Boehringer Ingelheim, Bristol-Myers Squibb, 
Takeda and GSK all spent USD 3–4 billion per NME, 
while Amgen, Novartis, AstraZeneca, Pfizer, Merck & 
Co., Sanofi and Roche each invested up to USD 8 billion 
per new drug approved by the FDA. And Eli Lilly and 
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Abbott/AbbVie invested even more than USD 10 billion 
per NME (2006–2014)—an amount of money that at 
least for some pharmaceutical companies put a question 
mark on the sustainability of their R&D models.
The reasons that have been discussed previously in the 
context of the high attrition rates and the interval dura-
tions also apply here. Further causes may have affected 
the R&D efficiency negatively, such as:
  • an inadequate number of projects in early R&D 
phases [12],
  • technically more complex research for new drug tar-
gets and subsequent preclinical and clinical studies 
[19],
  • a higher burden for approval and reimbursement of 
NMEs in view of the already approved drugs,
  • a lower risk tolerance of both regulators and society 
[19],
  • the high number of mergers & acquisitions (M&As) 
[31–33, 35],
  • the decreasing number of research-based pharma-
ceutical companies taking the financial risk of drug 
R&D [34] and
  • a negative effect of licensing, co-development, or 
joint ventures on the clinical development and 
approval durations [35].
Producing blockbusters could help
Even though the reasons for the low R&D efficiency are 
known, a sector-wide general concept to solve this prob-
lem does not exist so far. Quite simply, the low R&D 
efficiency could be compensated by an increase in the 
financial value per NME launched. Thus, the 4 % of suc-
cessful projects that result in new commercialized drugs 
have to provide enough revenue to justify the investment 
of the 96  % failed compounds and to provide enough 
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Total R&D expenditure between 2006-2014 [USD million]
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Fig. 1 R&D efficiencies of research-based pharmaceutical companies (2006–2014). Total number of NMEs (new molecular entities) approved by 
the FDA contrasted to the total R&D expenditure per company between 2006–2014. Bubble size illustrates the R&D intensity (R&D expenditure/total 
sales) in a  %-rate. Merck & Co including Schering Plough (starting 2009), Pfizer including Wyeth (starting 2009), Roche including Genentech (start-
ing 2010), Novartis including Alcon (starting 2010), Sanofi including Genzyme (starting 2011)
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profit for the investors. Consequently, commercializ-
ing more blockbuster drugs would compensate the low 
output and the increasing costs of pharmaceutical R&D. 
This rather traditional concept of the sector has resulted 
in an overall industry portfolio of 48 blockbuster drugs 
marketed in 2014 with some drugs such as Humira (USD 
11.0 billion, 2013), Enbrel (USD 8.75 billion, 2013) or 
Advair (USD 8.3 billion, 2013) providing extraordinary 
high annual sales of more than USD 5 billion. It is how-
ever expected that average peak sales per NME will not 
achieve blockbuster dimensions, reflecting the increased 
challenges of offering benefits over already existing treat-
ments [15]. In the mature markets of Europe and the 
US, new products face stronger competition, need to be 
developed for better profiled patients populations, and 
are launched to smaller market segments which in turn 
reduces the market potential of the new drugs. At once, 
drugs face high cost pressure from the public and pay-
ers which affects the commercial potential negatively. 
For example, the public already discusses the justifica-
tion for the prize of USD 84,000 per treatment regimen 
with Gilead’s blockbuster drug Solvadis for the treat-
ment of Hepatitis C (http://www.wsj.com/articles/
no-justification-for-solvadis-price-letters-to-the-edi-
tor-1409346750).
For sure, some big pharmaceutical companies will 
be able to keep their R&D productivity high by invest-
ing in breakthrough innovation. The overall industry 
however, may not be able to compensate the reduced 
R&D efficiency solely by launching commercially high 
value (blockbuster) drugs. In contrast, the extraordinar-
ily high R&D costs will make it for some pharmaceutical 
companies increasingly difficult to meet the investors’ 
expectations for a reasonable ROI exclusively from new 
products.
The low R&D efficiency necessitates far reaching 
consequences for research‑based pharmaceutical 
companies
In the last years, more and more pharmaceutical compa-
nies realized that their low R&D efficiencies necessitate 
changes to their R&D ecosystems. In an analysis of major 
research-based pharmaceutical companies it was shown 
that 73  % of the investigated companies were making 
process changes in R&D [36], such as by (see Fig. 2):
  • Creating growth options with M&As,
  • Improving R&D efficiency by restructuring R&D into 
better manageable smaller and biotechnology-like 
units [37, 38],
  • Reducing R&D costs by benefiting from virtual R&D 
and increasingly using cost-efficient outsourcing,
  • Widening the competence field by progressively 
expanding collaborations and research partnerships,
  • Increasing the technology base by more and more 
accessing drug candidates in all phases from external 
sources,
  • Strengthening the innovation potential by venture 
capital investments, and
  • Broadening the knowledge base by using the crowd.
Today, all major research-based pharmaceutical com-
panies use opportunities along the whole R&D value 
chain to access external innovation. While Novartis 
(https://external-novartis.idea-point.com/Default.aspx), 
Sanofi (http://en.sanofi.com/partners/being_our_part-
ner/being_our_partner.aspx) and AstraZeneca (https://
www.astrazeneca.com/our-science/partnering.html) use 
the potential of more traditional collaboration and part-
nering types (including corporate venture capital funds), 
other pharmaceutical companies have set-up alternative 
open innovation models ranging from innovation cent-
ers, crowdsourcing, open source innovation to virtual 
R&D.
Table 1 R&D efficiencies of  multinational pharmaceutical 
companies (2006–2014)
Merck & Co including Schering Plough (starting 2009), Pfizer including Wyeth 
(starting 2009), Roche including Genentech (starting 2010), Novartis including 
Alcon (starting 2010), Sanofi including Genzyme (starting 2011)
Source: Annual company reports, http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/
DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/
DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/UCM081805.pdf
Total R&D 
expenditures 
(USD million) 
(2006–2014)
Number  
of FDA  
approved  
NMEs (2006–
2014)
R&D efficiency 
(USD million/
NME) (2006–
2014)
Abbott/Abbvie 31,292 1 31,292
Eli Lilly 40,232 4 10,058
Roche 78,340 9 8704
Sanofi 42,948 6 7158
Merck & Co. 62,745 9 6972
Pfizer 72,125 11 6557
AstraZeneca 45,081 7 6440
Novartis 72,100 13 5546
Amgen 30,437 6 5073
GSK 47,109 12 3926
Takeda 23,361 6 3893
Bristol-Myers 
Squibb
33,006 9 3667
Boehringer  
Ingelheim
22,920 7 3274
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Research collaborations
Traditionally, the pharmaceutical industry has collabo-
rated with third parties to access specialty know-how 
[39]. As the complexity of pharmaceutical R&D increased 
fundamentally, nowadays collaborations are more and 
more used to get access to the required enlarged set of 
skills and technologies, such as novel drug targets, vali-
dation of targets, signal transduction pathway know-
how, animal models, disease expertise, translational 
medicine know-how and biomarkers. As for example, 
GSK is spending nearly half of its R&D budgets to col-
laboration partners from academia or the biotechnology 
industry [40]. In this context, it has established Discov-
ery Partnerships with Academia (DPAc), an alliance pro-
gram starting from early screening to late optimization in 
any disease area and any treatment modality. While the 
academic collaboration partner can profit from GSK’s 
know-how in drug discovery and from its resources in 
medicinal chemistry, preclinical safety and pharmacoki-
netics, GSK can access ideas from academia to boost its 
innovation potential (http://www.dpac.gsk.com). In some 
areas of research, pharmaceutical companies have even 
broke new grounds by moving their proprietary tech-
nologies, such as HTS, to a larger number of external 
academic and institutional laboratories to increase flex-
ibility and to benefit from governmental funding [41]. 
According to Frye [42], 78 academic screening centers 
focusing on high-risk drug targets were started in the 
USA till 2010. In Germany, the Lead Discovery Center 
(LDC) has been established in 2008 by the technology 
transfer organization Max-Planck-Innovation (MPI). 
The LDC aims at building a translational bridge between 
the excellence and know-how in basic research of Max-
Planck scientists and applied pharmaceutical research, 
as for example by offering HTS technologies (http://
www.lead-discovery.de/en/). Merck & Co. have started to 
launch in-depth academic partnerships with universities 
and academic institutes, such s the California Institute 
for Biomedical Research (Calibr), to translate academic 
basic research into new drugs (http://www.merck.com/
Challenges:
Higher burden for approval and 
reimburse-ment of NMEs 
Complex research for new drug 
targets
Poorly predictive animal 
models
Complexity of clinical trials
Lower risk tolerance of 
regulators and society
Licensing, co-development, or 
joint venture negotiations 
Commercials demands
Decreasing number of 
research-based pharmaceutical 
companies 
Strategic changes
High capitalized costs for 
R&D
Low NME output
+
=
Reduced R&D efficiency 
of research-based 
pharmaceutical companies
Results: Consequences:
Create growth options by M&As
Reduce R&D costs by cost-efficient 
outsourcing
Widen the competence field by 
collaborating with universities and 
biotechnology/ pharmaceutical 
companies
Increase the technology base by 
licensing drug candidates in all 
phases of R&D
Strengthen the innovation potential 
by venture capital investments
Broaden the knowledge base by using 
the crowd
Fig. 2 Challenges and consequences of the low R&D efficiency. NME new molecular entity, M&A merger and acquisition, R&D research and devel-
opment
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licensing/partnership_success/academic_partnerships.
html). Next, numerous pharmaceutical companies have 
closed their traditional R&D sites and opened new ones 
in close location with world-class academic institutions 
to better profit from their excellences and competences. 
As for example, Pfizer opened a new research site in 
Cambridge, Massachusetts, in 2014, after closing sev-
eral sites following the merger with Wyeth (http://www.
pfizer.com/research/science_and_technology/rd_loca-
tions/ma_cambridge). The new facility brings together 
around 1000 employees from Pfizer in one of the most 
well-known science hubs with famous universities, such 
as the Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT) or 
Harvard University, and more than 150 companies of the 
biopharmaceutical/biotechnology sector, amongst others 
Eli Lilly, Millennium (Takeda), AstraZeneca, Sanofi, GSK 
and Novartis (https://data.cambridgema.gov/Planning/
Life-Sciences-and-Technology-Listing/fv53-bvhy). Also 
the academic partners profit from the close collabora-
tions with pharmaceutical companies, as for example the 
Havard’s Office of Technology Development estimated 
that 4–5  % of its funding comes from industry collabo-
rations [43]. In sum, collaborations (in different forms) 
between pharmaceutical companies and academic insti-
tutions/biotechnology companies are the norm today, 
building complex collaboration networks with pharma-
ceutical companies being the nodes of the networks [42, 
44].
M&As and project acquisitions
Since the financial crisis of 2007, M&As have become 
increasingly important in the biopharmaceutical sec-
tor. Pharmaceutical companies use M&As to compen-
sate revenue losses of blockbuster patent expirations, to 
access strategically important intellectual property (IP), 
to exploit technology-based treatment innovations, to 
develop new core competencies, or to fill R&D pipeline 
gaps.
Most of the research-based pharmaceutical compa-
nies widened the breadth of their portfolio by access-
ing research projects and drug candidates from external 
sources to supplement their in-house pipeline and to 
meet at least part of their growth objectives by product 
innovation. Today, 50  % of the R&D pipelines of multi-
national pharmaceutical companies come from external 
sources [44].
Portfolio management
Another approach to increase R&D efficiency is a greater 
focus on portfolio management and, thus, on project-
related costs and project ROI. For example, DiMasi 
et al. reported a decrease in the average time from start 
of a research project to its abandonment in clinical tri-
als by 30 % from 4.7 years to 3.3 years, indicating a trend 
towards earlier decision-making which reduces R&D 
costs as drug candidates fail earlier and cheaper [35].
According to the principles of modern value-based 
portfolio management, a portfolio of projects must be 
large enough to compensate project failures in drug dis-
covery and development. While individual projects fail 
because of technical, commercial or market risks, the rest 
of the drug project portfolio must to be robust enough 
to provide the ROI expected by investors. The bigger the 
project portfolio the easier drug project failures can be 
compensated. As a consequence, the individual pipeline 
size of pharmaceutical companies increased in the past 
years [45]. Today, the corporate R&D pipelines of the top 
companies include more than 150 drug projects in devel-
opment phases, with GSK (261), Roche (248), Novartis 
(223), and Pfizer (205) having 200 and more drug projects 
in their portfolio [45].
R&D cost cuts
Some pharmaceutical companies analyzed the saving 
potential of R&D and cut their units to increase their 
R&D efficiencies. Principally, a reduction in R&D costs 
is combined with a release of R&D personnel and out-
sourcing of R&D activities to service providers in low-
cost countries to reduce operational and infrastructure 
costs. GSK announced in 2012 to realize annual savings 
of GBP 1 billion by 2016 by reducing the size of its R&D 
and manufacturing organizations (http://www.pharma-
times.com/article/13-02-07/GSK_puts_faith_in_pipe-
line_and_cuts_costs_after_tough_2012.aspx). Merck 
& Co. published to reduce its R&D, manufacturing and 
administration staff by 8.500 people which should result 
in a USD 1.25 billion cost saving (http://www.fiercep-
harma.com/story/skinny-earnings-cost-cuts-boost-
merck-bristol-myers-forest-fx-hits-sanofi/2014-04-29). 
Takeda’s new CEO, Christophe Weber, aims to reduce 
the R&D costs by specialization and focus on therapeu-
tic areas where Takeda has a leading position (http://
www.fiercebiotech.com/story/takeda-preps-stringent-
rd-new-boss-takes-reins/2014-08-05). The change is in 
line with its USD 1 billion cost cutting program (http://
www.fiercepharma.com/story/takedas-new-outsider-
cfo-charged-1b-cost-cutting-plan/2013-11-18). Pfizer 
has been very active in reducing its costs after executing 
two major mergers since 2003, when more than 50,000 
employees lost theirs jobs (http://www.fiercepharma.
com/story/pfizers-post-megamerger-cost-cutting-
record-51500-jobs-7-years/2014-04-29) and annual R&D 
expenditures were reduced from USD 9.4 billion (2010) 
to USD 6.7 billion (2013).
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Outsourcing
Today, outsourcing and collaborations with service pro-
viders are a standard in the pharmaceutical sector. Out-
sourcing companies are providing services along the 
whole value chain from research to development, mar-
keting and manufacturing [46–48]. The global drug dis-
covery outsourcing market was USD 14.9 billion (2014) 
and is expected to reach USD 25 billion by 2018 [49], 
while the market for CRO-conducted clinical trials was 
USD 23.1 billion (2014) and is expected to increase to 
USD 35.8 billion by 2020 (http://www.pharmsource.com/
market/how-big-is-the-market-for/). What has been 
outsourcing on demand with many external service pro-
viders and redundant internal functions will become an 
integrated model of outsourcing with a limited number 
of strategic partners and long-term relationships [50].
Innovation centers
The industry has also realized that innovation cent-
ers may be a driving force for creativity and innovation, 
a smart way to bring together company-internal and 
external experts and to integrate internal and external 
know-how to solve R&D challenges. As for example, 
GSK launched in 2007 its Center of Excellence for Exter-
nal Drug Discovery (CEEDD), an externally focused 
R&D center that facilitates drug discovery alliances up 
to clinical proof-of-concept (PoC) with external partners 
working across all therapeutic areas (http://www.out-
sourcing-pharma.com/Preclinical-Research/GSK-opens-
Centre-of-Excellence). It combines the model of a biotech 
alliance with the principles of a virtual organization and 
it provides diversity through externalization. CEEDD’s 
partners bring in their technologies and drug compounds 
while GSK is providing drug discovery and development 
expertise and services. If the drug candidate is showing 
proof-of-concept in clinical development, GSK is seeking 
a worldwide license for full development and commer-
cialization. GSK’s external drug discovery activities are 
supported by the in-house scientific consultancy Scinovo 
that manages the interface of external partners and inter-
nal scientists (http://www.gsk.com/en-gb/business-to-
business/discovery-and-development-consulting/). Till 
today, CEEDD helped to fill GSK’s early stage pipeline 
that consists now to 50 % of externally sourced projects 
(http://www.glaxosmithkline.at/common/pdf/130311_
GSK-auf-der-Life-Science-Success_2013.pdf).
Pfizer established the Global Centers for Therapeutic 
Innovation (CTIs) in 2010, an open innovation model 
that aims at founding global partnerships between Pfizer 
and academic medical centers (http://www.pfizer.com/
research/rd_works/centers_for_therapeutic_in-novation.
jsp). While Pfizer is providing financial funding, human 
resources and technologies, the academic partners bring 
in their hypotheses of new drug mechanisms. Decision-
making is done in joint steering committees. The inven-
tions are filed in the name of both partners with Pfizer 
having the right of first refusal [51].
J&J is also investing in improving its network to entre-
preneurs, startup companies, researchers, academic 
institutions and external innovators. To support its effort, 
J&J has even set up six dedicated sites, such as in San 
Diego or at the Texas Medical Center (http://jlabs.jnjin-
novation.com). Thereby, the company aims to support 
early research projects in fields of oncology, immunology, 
neuroscience, cardiovascular and metabolism, infectious 
diseases and vaccines to provide the collaborators  the 
necessary technical and financial resources to bring a 
product to marketability.
Open source
The open source philosophy is based on transparency, 
freedom-to-operate, access to results and products for 
everybody, collaborative improvements, no financial 
reward for contributors, but recognition in providing 
a better solution to a challenge. Although these princi-
ples do not fit in the context of the IP-driven pharma-
ceutical sector, some pharmaceutical companies entered 
the arena of open source innovation. For example, GSK 
together with Alnylam Pharmaceuticals and the MIT 
have formed the Pool for Open Innovation against 
neglected tropical diseases (NTDs) providing open 
access to 2300 patents in respect to the treatment of trop-
ical diseases (http://investors.alnylam.com/releasedetail.
cfm?ReleaseID=466757). GSK also collaborates with 
Bayer and Novartis in the Global TB Alliance (http://
partnerships.ifpma.org/partnership/global-alliance-for-
tb-drug-development-tb-alliance). Although GSK’s has 
been focusing on neglected diseases so far, it also started 
to apply this open innovation model to other therapeutic 
areas, such as to infectious and rare diseases or to its clin-
ical trial data [52]. Other examples of open source mod-
els in the pharmaceutical industry are the Open Source 
Drug Discovery initiative (http://www.osdd.net/home) 
that aims at providing affordable healthcare for neglected 
diseases and the African Network for Drugs and Diag-
nostics Innovation (ANDI) that was launched in 2008 
(http://www.andi-africa.org) [53–55].
Crowdsourcing
Eli Lilly is a pioneer and leader in the crowdsourcing field 
in the pharmaceutical industry. It initiated several crowd-
sourcing initiatives such as Innocentive® or YourEn-
core- both are now operated independently. YourEncore 
(www.yourencore.com) is an expert network working in 
technology industry, such as life science, consumer and 
food industries, that support companies to access expert 
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know-how to help to solve the companies’ problems. 
Fields of expertise in the pharmaceutical industry are 
preclinical and clinical development, clinical operations, 
manufacturing, regulatory affairs, organizational effec-
tiveness, safety, pharmacovigilance, and quality manage-
ment. Innocentive® (www.innocentive.com) is a global 
network of more than 365,000 registered problem solvers 
coming from about 200 countries and problem-posting 
companies, such as AstraZeneca, Eli Lilly, NASA, Procter 
& Gamble, Syngenta, have partnered with InnoCen-
tive® to get innovative ideas provided. More than 2000 
external challenges and more than 40,000 solutions were 
posted since the start of Innocentive® in 2001, and more 
than 1500 rewards have been given so far.
Alternatively, the crowd can bring in new ideas, such 
as target proposals, that are sourced to the R&D pipe-
line if evaluated positively. In 2009, Bayer Healthcare 
has started its crowd-sourcing platform Grants4Targets 
where it offers two types of grants of EUR 5000–10,000 
and EUR 10,000–125,000 for anyone who, for example, 
submits a target structure that is interesting for research 
[56]. The crowdsourcing platform receives noticeable 
global recognition, as around 2000 interested experts 
click the website per month. So far, most of the propos-
als came from Germany (21 %), Europe (except Germany, 
39 %) and the US (23 %) in the fields of oncology (64 %), 
cardiology (26 %) and gynecology (8 %). Most of the tar-
get approaches were small molecules (63 %). Until today, 
more than 1110 applications were filed, 13  % of which 
were accepted and rewarded with a total sum of EUR 3.2 
million resulting in 6 lead generation, one lead optimiza-
tion and two preclinical development projects [57].
Virtual R&D
A virtual R&D model can be defined as an organization 
which works with a limited number of internal staff and 
which uses external resources, technologies and facili-
ties on demand to develop their R&D projects efficiently. 
Although a virtual R&D model provides numerous 
advantages, such as reduced capital requirements and 
financial risks, reduced overhead costs, limited infra-
structure costs, or higher flexibility, the model has so far 
only successfully applied by Chorus, Shire, Protodigm, 
Debiopharm, and Endo Pharmaceuticals.
Chorus, an entity of Eli Lilly, has proven that virtual 
R&D can help to reduce both cost and time needed in 
pharmaceutical R&D (www.choruspharma.com). In 
2002, Chorus started as an alternative path for drug R&D 
with the aim to manage the complex R&D process lean 
and flexible and to bring preclinical compounds with ear-
lier decision in a “lean-to-PoC” model to the clinical PoC 
in a shorter time and at lower costs. Chorus manages a 
portfolio of 15–17 projects in the phases of candidate 
selection to PoC in 19 countries with around 40 full-time 
employees in a flat hierarchy model—all experts in the 
Chorus team report to one managing director. Approxi-
mately 25 % of Chorus’ budget are fixed overhead costs, 
the remaining 75 % are allocated to the external costs of 
the drug projects [58]. The success of Chorus is outstand-
ing, as since 2002, the productivity of Chorus has been 
3–10 times higher than the traditional pharmaceutical 
R&D model of Eli Lilly—in particular the improved PTRS 
in Phase II provided the greatest potential to increase the 
R&D efficiency [59].
Shire may have established the most radical concept 
in the pharmaceutical sector so far, as the whole R&D 
organization operates virtual as a knowledge leverager. 
As presented in a previous report, the top innovators of 
the industry usually follow the knowledge creator or the 
knowledge integrator models [44]. The knowledge crea-
tor is an open innovator type whereby the company has 
an inbound preference in innovation management com-
bined with a preferentially internal generated project 
portfolio. And the knowledge integrator is a preference 
toward external generated R&D projects in combination 
with in-house expertise in R&D management. Shire has 
drafted its new innovation model that combines several 
open innovation aspects into one coherent concept that 
helps to increase R&D efficiency [44]. Shire has a trim 
R&D team that is almost a virtual network with low over-
head costs. It focuses on external generated innovation in 
combination with a predominantly outside-oriented way 
of innovation management. It acquires ideas, know-how 
and technologies from other companies and universities 
to discover and develop new drugs that come primarily 
from external sources. This model offers the possibility 
to reduce attrition by selecting the right portfolio of low-
risk projects. It also provides the opportunity to man-
age the project pipeline effectively by accessing projects 
and resources from the outside flexibly. And it allows the 
option to access resources cost efficiently, as resources 
can be accessed globally with low overhead costs.
Conclusions
The reduced R&D efficiency makes it necessary for 
pharmaceutical companies to realign their R&D con-
cepts. Companies which aim to be the top innovators 
in the pharmaceutical industry can follow the knowl-
edge creator or knowledge integrator models. In these 
models innovation is preferentially created internally or 
by integrating external assets. These companies need to 
identify the right growth strategies, need to build up the 
right core competences for drug R&D internally, need to 
build external networks with academic partners and ser-
vice providers and, in particular, need to accept the high 
costs for product innovation and ensure a sustainable 
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investment in R&D to generate a steady flow of new inno-
vative drugs.
Pharmaceutical companies, which are not counted to 
be a top innovator, may still be successful when focusing 
on the growth options that are provided by the generics 
business and the emerging markets. While the worldwide 
drug prescription market is forecasted to grow at around 
6 % annually between 2015 and 2020, the generics busi-
ness will grow by 12 % per year in the same time [1]. And, 
already by 2016, it is expected that the pharmaceutical 
industry is generating around one third of its total sales 
in the emerging markets [60]. The financial potential in 
these countries is forecasted to be USD 500 billion by 
2020 [61]. As a consequence, some of the multinational 
pharmaceutical companies have changed their business 
models from purely research-based pharmaceutical com-
panies that focused on the traditional pharmaceutical 
markets to more diversified companies and are already 
generating today a major part of their total revenues out-
side of Europe, US and Japan by selling both innovative 
medicine and generic drugs [1].
Finally, research-based pharmaceutical companies that 
cannot afford to diversify or to follow the knowledge cre-
ator and integrator models need to have an eye on other 
R&D concepts that are more appropriate for their set-up. 
Certainly, open innovation has proven to be a concept 
of significant attention for the pharmaceutical industry. 
Either it can be used to complement the traditional R&D 
model to increase the reach of the internal R&D organi-
zation, to access external innovation more easily and to 
reduce R&D costs. Research alliance concepts such as the 
CTI and crowdsourcing can be ranked as most valuable 
examples to improve the R&D efficiencies. Or, and appli-
cable for organizations that are more open to a funda-
mental changes in their R&D models, it is recommended 
to follow the strategy of the knowledge leverager Shire 
which has demonstrated that this R&D concept can be 
translated into enhanced performance [44]. To become a 
knowledge leverager, pharmaceutical companies need to 
make the following modifications:
  • increase their absorptive capacities by implementing 
open innovation processes,
  • hire people who are open-minded, able to work with 
different cultures and aware that innovation need to 
be accessed globally,
  • improve their dynamic capabilities and interpersonal 
skills,
  • form more strategic alliances and active involve-
ments in innovation networks, and
  • develop managerial abilities to better utilize external 
partnerships.
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